

Peter the Great:

Another Look at a Modernization Process

Wontack Hong*

1. Peter the Great

Peter the great (1672-1725) was one of the few forces that left deep imprints on Russia.¹⁾ His reforms were, both in origin and in final aim, military-financial, nevertheless reacted upon the community at large.²⁾ Personally, he may be regarded as one of the happiest men on the world, in the sense that he had a concrete dream to pursue and much of it was realized during his lifetime.

When he visited western Europe, he was greatly impressed by their factories, foundries, shipyards, and especially by their regular standing army in jackets, gaiters and tricorne hats. But it seems that he had failed to comprehend the fundamental basis of the superiority of the West. When he came back, he tried to reform everything he could think out in order to build and keep the regular army along the lines of those of western Europe out of the social elements and resources available to him, without paying any attention to the social and economic results of his reforms.

"The driving power of Peter's activity was always war, and the initial field of operations of that activity was military reform, and its ultimate goal was financial re-organization."³⁾ He was successful in creating a big regular army, some big factories out of almost nothing, trebled the State revenue, and he created the best state Chancellery that Moscow had ever had.⁴⁾

*Senior fellow at the Korea Development Institute. The author was indebted to professor M.T. Florinsky of Columbia University for his comments on the earlier version of this paper.

1) "The Great" was his official title conferred upon him by the senate.

2) V.O. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia*, Vol. II (London, 1925), p. 207.

3) V.O. Kliuchevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

4) G. Vernadsky, *A History of Russia* (New Haven, 1953), p. 152.

The modernized standing army established by Peter was the vehicle to transform Russia into a European power. But Peter could find no other source of revenue to build his army and supporting industrial basis besides those of the peasants. In spite of the fact that he himself worked harder than any peasant by his own desire, he never understood that that kind of human instinct such as the pursuit of better living, if properly allowed to whole people, could be a great driving force of economic development in the long-run. Instead, he tried to increase the productivity of the majority of his people by knout. The serfdom, the process of which had already begun before the reign of Peter, was developed into the most brutal and backward forms after him⁵⁾

He compelled every single male member of the *dvoriane* to serve the State, either as civil or as military or as a commercial servant. In return, the *dvorlane* were duly compensated by the hereditary possession of their estates and increased power over their serfs.

His genuine innovation was the adoption of the poll tax on male "souls" by the suggestion of his unofficial advisors. It clarified the concept of tax paying unit and allowed nobody to remain not being taxed. In order to make a "good beginning", Peter used his army officers to collect the poll tax during the first years. The army officers visited peasants three times a year, and they were efficient enough to "take the last means of the peasants" in taxes. Later, when the landlords were required to collect the taxes, they were obliged to sustain the expectations of the Treasury by obtaining and producing amounts equal to those which had been extorted from the peasants by the military functionaries. The 'good beginning' had been made, and the tradition of severity had been established.⁶⁾

The revenue from the poll tax was used to keep his army, and the rate per soul was arrived at by dividing the estimated amount of such expenditure by the number of taxpayers. Peter thus turned such a hard financial problem to a simple algebraic function comprehensible to him, but it eliminated all remaining distinctions between the serfs and other classes of bondmen, thus bringing to its conclusion a process that was well advanced in the seventeenth century.⁷⁾

5) Although many of his reforms "aimed merely at perfecting the existing order by giving it the more civilized outward forms of the West", he certainly helped the development of serfdom in Russia. S.F. Platonov, *History of Russia* (London 1925), p. 231.

6) P.I. Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution* (New York 1949), pp.110—112.

7) M.T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (New York, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 363—364.

Comrade Stalin (1879-1953), a figure comparable to Peter in many ways, made a comment: "Peter accomplished a great deal toward the creation and strengthening of the national state of the landowners and merchants. But it should also be stated that it was carried out at the expense of the serf peasantry, which was being fleeced threefold."⁸⁾ However, Comrade Stalin did not make any comment on his own accomplishments.

2. Peter's Promotion of Industry

Since the objective of Peter's industrialization policy was to support his army, factories were first established by the State and managed by the State officials but eventually handed to the private entrepreneurs, mostly to or through the court favorites.

He also induced or forced merchants to build factories. Since they were not familiar with industrial works at that time, he had granted generous subsidies, guaranteed a market for their products, and exempted both their owners and their workers from all forms of financial and military obligations. Sufficient number of bondage labor were drawn from the State peasantry and supplied to the factories. He permitted factory owners to buy villages for their enterprises. In order to protect the industry, high tariff duties were imposed and often prohibited the importation of competing foreign products. However, these kinds of assistances were accompanied with heavy obligations towards the State and its close supervision. The ascribed peasants could not be sold apart from the business, and the business could be sold only by permission of the Manufactures Collegium.

The bulk of industrial production consisted of mining and iron works, arsenals, canvas for sail, linen, wool cloth, hemp, glass, leather, silk, mirrors, etc. But the manufacturing under Peter generated no revolution in techniques, and developed largely on the basis of old technique of handicraft and *kustar* production.⁹⁾

It was only in mining where serf labor could be most effectively employed, and Peter was able to furnish his army with muskets exclusively of Russian manufacture and also much of other ammunitions. But in cloth industry, the serf labor was not so effective in spite of the improved supervision and severe discipline and in spite of his desire to make Russia not to "buy even

8) P.I. Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

9) P.I. Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, p.291.

one uniform from the foreigner.”¹⁰⁾

Peter's factories and the revenue from poll tax could support his modernized regular army, but the domestic nature of Russian industry was not changed. Further, it seems that Peter had never tried to Europeanize every Russian, but only the people surrounding him, that is, the nobilities and merchants, though he asked to work hard to every soul in Russia. He ordered the people surrounding him to wear German, Saxson or French clothes. But he generously allowed the peasant to remain in their old Russian clothes. He ordered all the *boyars* and military officers to shave their chins. Merchant and lesser folk might go bearded by paying tax. But the beards of the peasants were tax-free so long as their owners remained in their villages. He never minded whether the peasants had bushy beards on their faces or not so long as they were supplying enough revenue for the State.

One may say that except in external and in certain immediately tangible and visible changes and so-called improvements of material order, Peter's reform left things very much as they were, 'only more so'.¹¹⁾ But the absolute monarchy, the nobilities with increased power, the ever increasing Russian army, and the helpless peasants, soon developed and consolidated a peculiar society based on mass serfdom.

3. Economic Development after Peter

Peter left one of the most autocratic empire in the world and the nation in a great measure united. He showed his nobility in what the material wealth of Russia consisted, and showed them how it might be exploited.

After Peter, Russia was mainly ruled by the court favorites, the regiment of the Guards and the secret police. His successors were his widow, his grandson, his half-niece, his half-great-great-nephew, his daughter, his grandson, and the latter's German wife. The Tsars themselves exercised the absolute power "more in phrase than in fact; the power actually fell into the hands of the class from which the Tsar chose his civil and military administrations."¹²⁾ In the eighteenth century, the *dvorianstvo* practically ruled the Government, and the Guards of the metropolis which were entirely composed of nobility played a major role in the change of throne.

Under Peter the nobility had to do various tasks and engaged in the

10) V.O. Kliuchevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

11) R. Beazley, N. Forbes and G. Birkett, *Russia: From the Varangians to the Bolsheviks*, (Oxford, 1918), p. 241.

12) G. Alexinsky, *Modern Russia*, (London, 1915), p. 64.

endless wars, in return for their privilege of land ownership. Not only they could breathe again at his death, they could feel the increased power of their class, and thenceforth, the welfare of the State had been regarded more and more from the viewpoint of the nobles. The externally Europeanizing nobilities were fiercely devoted to the enslavement of the people, and greatly emancipated themselves. Peter III exempted the nobility from compulsory service, but at that time, the "glorified government service" had come to be regarded as a privilege, not as an obligation.

(1) Manufacturing Industries

Under Peter the merchants were the first to organize the industries who were exempted from taxes and military service. They were protected by tariffs, and the rates were prohibitive in cases of furs, flax, hemp, wool, and tallow. But the prospect of gain also induced the nobilities into industry. These nobilities who had neither experiences nor aptitude, sought for profits, not from the efficient management, but from the subsidies, bounties, and monopolistic privileges which were generally granted on the basis of favoritism and bribes. As a result, the nobility forced the Government to limit the activity of the merchants by prohibiting them to buy serfs in 1762.

"While the serfs were bad workers, the nobles were deplorable organizers. Accustomed to live by the fruit of gratuitous labor, they had neither the energy nor the initiative required by a successful manufacturer.¹³⁾ Since they virtually monopolized the production of articles for the army, there was nothing to stimulate them to improve the technique of production.

All the factories, whether operated by the merchants or noblemen, were under firm control of the government. "The volume, articles, and quality of output, the terms of sale of the product, the level of wages, and conditions of work"¹⁴⁾ were fixed by the Government. The Government even attempted to improve the quality of factory products by limiting a working day to 14 hours in 1740. The system was close to a primitive form of the centrally planned economy.

The number of effectives of the regular army exceeded 200,000 under Peter, and the number was doubled by the end of Catherine. Since the frequent wars with the western neighbours forced Russia to follow closely their standard of military organization, the demand for weapons, clothes, and food for the army was great, and naturally the State treasury was one

13) G. Alexinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

14) P.I. Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

of the largest purchasers.¹⁵⁾

Although the potential market for the factory product was large, the factory products could not replace the products of peasants because of its low productivity. There was no change in the self-contained character of peasant economy, and the development of miscellaneous manufactures for consumption within the country was thus a comparatively modern affair.¹⁶⁾

While almost none of the factory product was consumed by the peasants, the nobilities consumed mostly the goods imported from abroad. For instance, there was no general demand for the domestic factory-made cloth. The peasants did not use it, and the gentry disliked the home-product. After all, the cloth factories could not fully satisfy the needs of the Government. The Government contracts for army clothing were enough, and were so profitable that they never tried to improve the productivity to secure a wider market.

So long as the simple unskilled labor was the chief factor of production, the forced labor under rigorous discipline and low scale of remuneration was within certain limits economically advantageous.¹⁷⁾ However, such a method of production could only allow the algebraic expansion and never generated creative innovation in production techniques. Even at the end of the eighteenth century, the concentration of production processes under one roof was uncommon, and work was carried on in many small shops or in the workers' own cottages.¹⁸⁾

(2) The Cottage Industry

Due to the extremely poor quality of factory production, the operation of small establishments of the cottage industry type, which were carried by peasants chiefly as a part-time occupation subsidiary to farming, made a good progress, satisfying the various non-military need of the State and upper class as well as peasants' own consumption. Linen was mainly produced by *kustars* and bought from the small towns and villages by merchants. The wool cloth for soldier's uniforms, which had been mostly supplied by the forced factory labor in large factories, began to be supplied increasingly by the peasants at the end of eighteenth century.¹⁹⁾

Some articles consumed by the upper class, such as silk fabrics, silk

15) A. Kornilov, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

16) James Mavor, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

17) James Mavor, *op. cit.*, p. 534.

18) M.T. Florinsky, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 562.

19) M.T. Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 562.

taffeta, shawls, and gold and silver articles, were also produced by the cottage-industry. Many articles which were used by the family of landlord, such as the wood furniture, linen, carts, agricultural implements, were produced by their peasants. Peasants were generally engaged in weaving linen, in preparing wool cloth, in knitting lace, and in producing a number of other articles, partly for its own consumption, partly for landlord and partly for sale.

In 1769 anyone who paid a small tax was entitled to have a loom in his own house, and the competition of the individual weavers appeared to have resulted in improvement in the quality of the good so that importation was, to some extent, checked. The landowners, especially in the provinces paying *obrok*, permitted serfs to set up industrial undertakings. Although their scales were rather small, and generally they employed their own villagers or those of other villages, they sometimes grew into sizable manufactures. Of course "a large part of their gains undoubtedly found their way into the pockets of their owners."²⁰

(3) The Factory Labor Force

According to Tugan Baranovsky, the factories became "real work-houses, where order was maintained by strict discipline and onerous punishment was the only incentive to work."²¹ The owners could punish by flogging, by sending the offenders into the army and, with the permission of the governmental authorities, by banishment to Siberia. Any protest against unbearable conditions or work were dealt with by military force and corporal punishment.

Although the wages were to be paid, the workers, if they were bondmen, hardly ever received their wage in cash, and "hardly anything was left after their taxes had been deducted from their wages; this was particularly the case when they were employed in the private factories."²² This peasant hated the town factory and "Pugachev's greatest success was among the factory ascribed peasants."²³

In 1762 the purchase of serfs for employment in factories by the non-*dvoriane* was prohibited, which improved the condition of nobility-owned enterprises in competition with the merchant owned enterprises. By 1773 almost one-third of all factories, including one-half of the cloth factories,

20) James Mavor, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

21) & 22) S.P. Turin, "From Peter the Great to Lenin." (London, 1935) p. 4-6.

23) A. G. Mazour, "Russia: Past and Present" (New York), p. 191.

belonged to nobles; by the beginning of the nineteenth century, out of 98 cloth factories supplying goods to the Government, 74 belonged to nobles.²⁴⁾ As a result, there was an increase in the proportion of hired workers employed in merchant factories. This development was closely connected with the growing incidence of *obrok* in place of *barshchina* in the central provinces of Russia.

To pay the heavy *obroks*, many peasants, by securing permission from landlord who had no reason to refuse it, went to town and were employed in the factories. According to Lyashchenko, the number of factories, workers, and the proportions of hired workers were:²⁵⁾

	1770	1804	1812
No. of Factories	260	2,402	2,322
No. of Workers	55,300	95,200	119,000
Hired Workes (%)	32%	47%	50%

The factory system developed a little by the general trend of economic liberalism, the growth of skilled labor group and the increased supply of little more efficient labor in the form of *obrok* paying peasants which gradually replaced the convics, beggars, and the bonded peasants in the factory.

(4) Peasants and Agriculture

The consolidation of serfdom gave many advantages to the Government. It could acquire the needed amount of revenue and recruits simply by taxing the landowners according to the number of male souls they possessed, and so long as the landowners fulfilled the allotments the Government did not mind how they treated their peasants. For efficiency, the Government equipped the landowners with increased judicial and police powers. Many ukases were issued and they bit by bit deprived the peasants of the last remnants of liberty; on October 25, 1730, peasants were forbidden to buy or accept mortgages, rather the peasant became a chattle which could be bought and sold; on May 6, 1736, the State gave the landlord complete liberty to punish, at his discretion, fugitive peasants. Although a peasant was sent as a recruit into perpetual military service, the ukase of July 1742, deprived the peasant of his right to join the army voluntarily and thus escape obligations as a serf. On January 7, 1765, the law giving the

24) J.D. Clarkson, "A History of Russia." (New York, 1961), p. 278.

25) P.J. Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

landlord the right to exile serfs to hard labor was expanded to let the serf deserving punishment could be exiled to Siberia for any period his master might determine. At the end, he lost even the right of complaint, for he could not petition against his owners. To quote the expression of Nicolas I, "absolutism had 150,000 unpaid prefects of police and it simplified the problem of administrating so populous a country and diminished the expenses of the State."²⁶⁾

The uniform assignment of poll tax might have made the more diligent peasants more prosperous than the less ones in theory, but the very existence of nobility helped to keep the peasant class in economic equality, that is, equally destitute. While the total tax to be collected was assigned to the nobility in a specified sum, the amount which he might individually collect was not specified. Furthermore, the payment of taxes was confused with the other obligations of his peasants, and wide opportunity for extortion was opened up.²⁷⁾

However, the nobles were not good managers. The military training and severe discipline which they could learn during their earlier years spent in city barracks were of no use for efficient management of their estates. Generally the landlords endeavored to "deprive the peasant farm of any part of the indispensable product above the starvation subsistence minimum of the peasant through the *obrok*."²⁸⁾ Many peasants under the *obrok* system of farming was said to have a tendency toward idleness, indifference, shiftlessness, and drunkenness whenever they could, sometimes, in the hope that "the landlord, upon seeing their general impoverishment, might reduce the *obrok* and for give the arrears."²⁹⁾

Under *barshchina* not only the land allotments were smaller but the peasants were also extremely overworked than those under the *obrok* system. There were many departures from the custom of working three days a week for their lord, and sometimes the peasants had to work a little in his own fields before six o'clock in the morning and after nine o'clock at night, and in order to render this possible he economized his strength, and worked as little as possible in his master's fields during the day.³⁰⁾ Therefore, regardless of the stretches of the working hours of peasants, there could not be much increase in productivity and it only made the life

26) G. Alexinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

27) James Mavor, "*Economic History of Russia*." (London, 1914), Vol. I. p. 113.

28) & 29) P.I. Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

30) D.M. Wallace, "*Russia*." (New York, 1905), p. 416.

of peasants harder to endure. To the landlord, one great regretful fact might have been that there were no more than 24 hours in a day.

The landlords did not have enough capital to, and never tried to, improve the productivity of peasants through such uncertain and time consuming methods as the improvement of the method of cultivation, and the incitement of the incentives of the peasants to improve. They relied upon the visible and quantitative methods such as the expansion of their acreage and extensive grain raising by means of exploiting the peasant labor still further.

Many nobles who were accustomed to the comforts of city life left their estates to the management of subordinates or of the female and younger member of the family of the owner, and there were many absentees who lived beyond their means in the city and "demanded from their steward, under pain of giving him or his son as a recruit, a much greater yearly sum than the estate could be reasonably expected to yield."³¹⁾ Some retired officers who wished to establish a certain order and discipline on their estates, employed merciless corporal punishment which were popular in the army. But the severe discipline, which was good only to let a man die bravely, or rather recklessly in the battlefield, never cured the laziness and disorderliness. The horrible treatments only reduced the peasants to a state of absolute insensibility.

It was said that the State peasants who generally had more allotments, lighter tax burden, and no landlords, were a little better than those under landlords. But they were under the petty officials who never lived on their meager salaries and were so corrupted as to be said that "of every hundred rubles collected from the people, not more than thirty actually reached the Treasury."³²⁾ And it is also said that "a government post, a *chinovnik* might possess no more than the clothes on his back, he would, within four or five years at the most, have so thoroughly skinned the peasantry committed to his departmental care as, still a man drawing an official salary only of 40 or 50 roubles a year, to be able to build for himself a fine stone mansion."³³⁾

According to Alexinsky, the amounts of exported grain were about 12,000 pounds (£) in 1758, 106,400 pounds in 1778, 870,000 pounds in 1802, which means that the exploitation of the peasant went still further.³⁴⁾ The peasants were dragged to cultivate more land, and the revenue of the State and the

31) D.M. Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

32) James Mavor, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

33) V.O. Kliuchevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

34) G. Alexinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 62. It was estimated that toward 1830 Russia exported a fifth part

nobility was increased. The State also gained by the increase in population. Majority of peasant population were inadequately fed and actually starved, and the surplus was used to keep the army and the nobilities to be westernized.

4. A Century After Peter the Great

The French speaking military-bureaucratic class of landowner in western dress was far apart from their peasants. The peasants were poor, and remained poor. On the whole, "nothing came into Russian house-hold from external world save some luxuries" to the upper class.³⁵⁾ The peasants with their sheepskin kaftans, thick coarse underwear, could not feel any improvement. They slept on benches or on the stove and covered themselves with sheepskin coats or jackets, putting sackcloth and straw underneath³⁶⁾

If we remind the fact that usually the uncommon events can survive in the records of history, maybe the great majority of the landlords were by no means such inhuman taskmasters as it sometimes supposed. Since the peasants were at the mercy of the landlords, so long as the landlords acted towards his serfs in an enlightened, rational, humane way, probably the peasants could have been better off than supposed, well protected against the Government, and everybody working on his land or in the mansion of the landlord, that is, fully employed.

But important fact in Russia was that the autocratic power had developed far more rapidly, and did upset the balance of power most unfavourably against the peasants, to which Peter contributed greatly, and consequently there was no need for the landlord to have any compromising attitude toward peasants. Having once lost its balance so heavily, it found her way to such an unprecedented mass serfdom.

There were no legal principle in the life of peasants, in the relations of the classes to one another and to the State. "The legal condition of the peasants in the noble's estates grew worse, and the bondage-right reached its culminating point" under the reign of Catherine.³⁷⁾ If we took one of the Moscow Gazette of 1801 at random, there we could read such a customary advertisement; "To be sold: Three coachmen, well trained and handsome;

of her whole harvest.

35) S. Th. Platonov, *op cit.*, p. 117.

36) J. Kucharzewski, "*The Origins of Modern Russia.*" (New York, 1948), p. 50.

37) A. Kornilov, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

and two girls..."³⁸⁾

Generally, the efficiency of labor force depends upon its motivation. Nobody can take care of and improve one's well-being more efficiently than himself, and man works harder when he works by his own avarice. The slave evades work as much as possible whenever they can. In a society in which the majority of people can not raise his status once born as a peasant, and confiscated everything over and above those for his bare subsistence, there can not be any significant economic development. The higher standard of living of nobility could not arouse any incentive to work harder. There could be only resignation and, if not, it could only be a painful thing to see for the peasant.

Quite opposite was to the nobility; they had much chances to make comparison between their living standards with those of Western Europe. Whenever they got the inferiority feeling aroused by the unfavourable comparisons between living standards, they worked hard to extract more from their peasants. But they, who could not understand the complicated economic world, could not be of any help for the economic development of Russia in the modern sense. Whenever somebody could better off, somebody else had to get worse off, and the latter was the majority. There was no reason for the ruling class to change the serfdom to any other form, and for the peasants, no power.

According to the census at the end of the Catherine in 1783, the male population of the peasants were 12,126,498; the burgers, 293,743; merchants, 107,408; and the tax-exempted, i. e., noble, clergy, and State officials were 310,880.³⁹⁾ The standard of living of the privileged class, which amounted to about three percent of the whole population, was improved greatly along the western Europe at the enormous cost of the peasants.

General economic condition of Russia at that time can be partly perceived by her trade pattern. Russia exported chiefly "hemp and flax, flat iron, rough linen, sail cloth, timber cordage, bristles, hides, and furs," that is, the products of serf labor in Government-subsidized factories and peasants. Principal imports were "woolen cloth for army uniforms, wines, spirits, cane sugar, silks, cottons, dyestuffs, tea, coffee, and fruit,"⁴⁰⁾ which were

38) D. M. Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

39) A. Kornilov, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

40) M. T. Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 565.

solely for the consumption of army and upper class.

It was sometimes said that the Russian industry was developed significantly at the end of eighteenth century by showing the fact that when Catherine II came to throne there were only 984 factories and workshops but in the year of her death there were 3,161. However, according to James Mavor, the value of products of the Russian factories in 1773 was about three and a half million rubles.⁴¹⁾ But in the middle of the eighteenth century, the expenses of the Government were already nineteen million rubles; eight and half for the army, two million rubles for administration and the rest, about nine million rubles, for the upkeep of the Court and the payment of high officials.⁴²⁾ If these kinds of statistics were ever correct, the value of factory products were less than a fifth of Government expenditures.

It was also said that from the agricultural class a substantial number passed into the class of factory and handicraft industrial workers and quite a few towns were erected. However, the urban populations were only 0.3 million (2.3% of total population) in 1772, 1.3 million (3.6%) in 1796, and 1.7 million (3.8%) in 1815.⁴³⁾ It was only in the nineteenth century that the cotton industry could improve its productivity as to replace the linen produced by peasants. If we take the worst example of iron product, "in absolute terms, Russian production by the eve of Emancipation had about doubled as against the end of the eighteenth century, while British production had increased almost thirty-fold."⁴⁴⁾ For the Russian economy, the size of its industrial production at the end of eighteenth century seems to have been too small to be of any great help for a smooth process of industrial progress and evolution. Maybe its size was only large enough to result in a revolution after a century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexinsky, G., *Modern Russia*, London, 1915.

Beazley, R., Forbes, N., and Birkett, G.A., *Russia: From the Varangians to the Bolsheviks*, Oxford, 1918.

41) James Mavor, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

42) G. Alexinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

43) P. I. Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 272—273.

44) J.D. Clarkson, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

- Clarkson, J.D., *A History of Russia*, New York, 1961.
- Florinsky, M.T., *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*, Vol I, New York, 1953.
- Kliuchevsky, V.O., *A History of Russia*, Vol. IV, London, 1926.
- Kornilov, A., *Modern Russian History*, New York, 1943.
- Kucharzewski, J., *The Origin of Modern Russia*, New York, 1948.
- Lyashchenko, P.I., *History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution*, New York, 1949.
- Mavor, James, *Economic History of Russia*, Vol. I, London, 1926.
- Mazour, A.G., *Russia: Past and Present*, New York.
- Platonov, S.F., *History of Russia*, London, 1925.
- Turin, S.P., *From Peter the Great to Lenin*, London, 1935.
- Vernadsky, G. and Karpovich, M., *A History of Russia*, New Haven, 1954.
- Wallace, D.M., *Russia*, New York, 1905.