This paper investigates the effects of the macroprudential policy, the financial supervisory’s independence and the bank’s external governance on the financial stability and the systemic crisis possibility of the banking industry. The results are as follows: (i) The banking sector’s systemic crises should not be analized as an extreme extension of its financial unstability. (ii) Those key policy and governances have a long run sustaining effects which indicate that they might improve the banks’ fundamentals qualitatively. (iii) The macroprudential policy and the financial supervisory’s independence enhance the financial stability, while the former has more positive effect in the countries where its strength is comparatively lower than the other countries. (iv) The bank’s external governance reduces the financial stability, but it also has a positive effect, that can be found distinctly in the countries where the strength of the external governance is comparatively lower than the other countries. (v) The macroprudential policy and the external governance tend to be immediately effective in reducing the possibility of systemic crises.