This paper explores how effectively delegates’ legal efforts are controlled bycontingent fees, as well as in what manner the size of contingent fees isinfluenced by the plaintiffs’ liquidity constraints and degree of risk aversion. Inour court-contest model, defendants represent themselves while the plaintiffsemploy attorneys on a contingent-fee basis. Delegates receive a fixed feeregardless of outcome, with a contingent fee receivable upon winning thecase. Results are obtained from a two-stage subgame model as follows. First,delegates show a strategic behavior of concentrating on the cases with higherwinning probabilities while treating the rest with relative negligence, thusimplying that contingent fees may fall short of remedying the delegates’insufficient legal efforts. Second, higher degree of risk-aversion gives rise tolarger contingent fees. Third, in accordance with differing shapes ofrisk-aversion, plaintiffs’ liquidity constraints manifest opposite influences on thesize of contingent fees. That is, plaintiffs’ initial wealth raises contingent feesin case risky assets are an inferior good, while the opposite holds in case ofa normal good.