The paper is an attempt to understand the conditions for the longevity of Chosŏn dynasty(1392-1910) in Korea on the economic base. It focuses on incentives to make elites and masses cooperate with the dynasty, while previous studies explained it mainly with the balances of political powers. The dynasty was able to get loyalty from elites who constituted dominant coalition by guaranteeing them various rents. The main sources of the rents were in the governmental finances and commercial sectors depending on the finances, with reflecting the redistributive economic system. ‘Gift economy’ between the elites based upon the local governmental finances assumed a role to secure and consolidate the dominant coalition. Keeping the agrarian identity of the elites also contributed to the longevity by excluding merchants and craftsmen from the coalition. Though the dynasty made severe laws against all kind of rebels, the ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ of the masses by public goods was more important than the laws. The grain storage system prevented economic crises from transforming toward political ones. It was critical to maintain the balance between the rents to elites and the public goods to masses.