This study quantitatively analyzes the intergenerational welfare impacts of policy alternatives with different cost-sharing structures to respond to the deteriorating health insurance financing caused by demographic changes due to low fertility and aging, using a heterogeneous agent overlapping generation general equilibrium model. The analysis shows that due to the rapidly rising nature of health care costs in the later stage of life, policies that increase out-of-pocket spending will cause significant harm to the welfare of the current older generation. In contrast, the policy scenario with additional taxation based on labor income results in a significant increase in welfare for the current generation and a significant decrease in welfare for future generations. This is because by the 2060s, when the additional fiscal burden increases dramatically due to the significant increase in the old-age dependency ratio, the current generation will have largely retired from the labor market, shifting most of the additional tax burden to future generations. For the policy scenario that uses consumption tax to address the additional tax burden, the change in intergenerational welfare is more uniform than for the other scenarios. This is because the life cycle of consumption, which is the tax base of consumption tax, remains flat over its entire life compared to the life cycle of labor supply.